



# **Beyond Western Paradigms of International Relations: Towards an Islamic Perspective on Global Democracy**

by: Professor Nadia Mostafa

A paper presented to Building Global  
Democracy Workshop  
Cairo 6-8 December  
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Civilization  
Center for  
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Researches



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***Introduction\*:***

***Global Democracy: Towards a mapping of the debate***

Under the impact of important global developments in the last quarter of the twentieth century, an array of issues has stirred academic, intellectual and political discussions, whether on the level of global politics or on the level of revisions in IR as a discipline, with various paradigms and schools of thought. These issues are: Islam and democracy, Islam and development, Islam and human rights, Islam and the Clash of Civilizations, Islam and terrorism, and so on and so forth. These issues were associated with broader issues, such as Islam in the new global system, Islam and global changes and Islam and globalization... etc. These intellectuals, political and academic debates have not yet been settled, posing serious challenges. These debates have two features:

**First:** they invoke Islam versus diverse social phenomena such as democracy, development

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and so on. Whereas what is required is invoking paradigm(s) emanating from an Islamic frame of reference versus paradigms emanating from other frames of reference when studying the same issues or phenomenon. Nevertheless, the social scientific studies on Islam continued to consider Islam just as one variable affecting the development of these phenomena.

**Second:** all incidences of debates and discussions originate from outside the Muslim world, and therefore, Muslims did not participate in setting the agenda and priorities. Their role was limited to participate in and respond to the agenda of policies, ideas and theories set by the West. This agenda do not necessarily reflect the context and priorities of the Muslim world.

Revisions of the state of art in IR- during the past three decades- occurred within this complex picture. The main feature of these revisions was the renewed interest in the role of religion, culture, and values in the scientific study of IR. Another feature was that the boundaries between the internal and external have been shaken (in theory and practice).

Revisions and discussion took place within IR, a discipline that claims to be international; however, it remains unwilling to recognize alternative paradigms<sup>(1)</sup>.

In this paper we enter the debate over what is called “global democracy”. This debate reflects all the intersections of internal and external factors. It also reflects a new phase in the development of these intersections in the western circles.

These multi-level boundaries on the level of practice, theory and thought was the outcome of the domination of modernism, positivism and behaviorism in the age of the “scientification” of IR as a value-free science under the impact of the frame of reference of the victorious power in first and second world wars, especially the American school emanating from a secular epistemology<sup>(2)</sup>.

International relations theory has witnessed important revisions, bring to bear the impacts that these transformations have on theorizing for IR, including testing the credibility and efficiency of the paradigms and theories of IR<sup>(3)</sup>. Among the prominent outcomes of these revisions is that IR as an independent discipline of political science, established nearly three quarter of a century ago (focusing mainly on the foreign and the international), is currently undergoing a crisis.

The following features and characteristics can describe and summarize this crisis<sup>(4)</sup>:

First, the absence of a dominant paradigm in the discipline in terms of *what* is studied (the substance) and *how* it is studied (the methodology). Second, there is no general theory in IR. Besides, major theories failed to predict the end of the Cold War. Third; the state of flux both in substance and/or methodology reflected in the “posts”: post Cold War, post modernism, and post positivism. Fourth: the boundaries between international relations and other social sciences and humanities have been shaken and that was because the scope of IR has been expanded in terms of having a more complex research agenda after renewing the interest in the religious, cultural and civilizational aspects of international relations and the rise of new international actors and processes. IR methodology has been revised as well.

Among the main features of post Cold War and post-positivism revisions, we can find two main and complementary features: First: the rise of importance of the role of religion and culture in the study of IR. Second: the revision of positivist-behavioral empirical methodology, which led to reconsidering the role of values in the scientific study of IR. Halliday and Holsti explain the lack of a general theory and a

dominant paradigm in IR as the result of ignoring the role of norms, history and philosophy. The role of values – among other aspects- was one of the main elements in the Second Great Debate in the history of IR theory; that is the debate between traditionalists and behavioralists. The renewed interest in the importance of values is combined with the interest in the cultural and religious aspects- especially since the end of the Cold War. The debate clustered around two issues: Are the cultural and religious aspects independent or dependent variables? Do religious and cultural differences necessarily lead to conflicts and what are their impact on world peace, security and stability?

Concurrently, in political science in general, there were discussions concerning the “redefinition of the political”. The cultural, civilizational (as well as religious) approaches have contributed to the redefinition of the level of analysis to go beyond the traditional levels (the state and the international system) to include the social and the lived reality. It also contributed to redrawing the boundaries of what can be counted as IR topics to include new issues.

In other words, the revisions included three issues: boundaries of discipline, the scope of the discipline, and the methodology.

These revisions took place under the impact of global transformations (in which causes were mixed up (confused) with aspects and impacts), such as the end of the Cold War, intensified globalization, and 9/11. These transformations can be categorized as either structural transformations or transformation in the systemic power or processes<sup>(5)</sup>.

Talking about democracy from within the international relations theory was one of the major outcomes of these revisions; that is theorizing under the label International political theory<sup>(6)</sup>; which reflected the renewed interest in philosophy and thought, on the one hand and social theory on the other<sup>(7)</sup>.

These topics, the international system or order on the one side and democracy on the other represent two of the most ancient topics tackled by international relations theory and political theory respectively. Now as they intersect they became one of the highly debated and discussed topic politically and academically. Hence, the crisis of the global system due to globalization, post -bipolarity, and post 9/11, as well as the crisis of liberal democracy, the crisis of

capitalism and the crisis of modern societies are two sides of the same coin around which various revisions revolve<sup>(8)</sup>. For example, studies of good governance are linked to studies of world society and world community<sup>(9)</sup>.

Governance, local or global, invokes the art and values of governance and calls for a way to operationalize it socially using soft power, not hard power based on traditional power relations. Therefore, global democracy entails global governance. Global democracy is a value-laden concept and reflects all the problems of universalism and cultural relativism, in the same way like other concepts combined with the “global” such as global ethics, global values, and global economy ...etc.

Part one of this study tackles specific issues that reflect the objectives of these study and provide an introduction to its vision from an Islamic civilizational perspective of IR based on a critical reading of western literature dealing with the issue of global democracy. These issues are:

1. Have the boundaries between the two theories been shaken that global democracy became a real point of intersection or is it just an invocation of the impact of the outside on Western liberal democracy?



2. Is there a consensus among various schools with western paradigms over the concept? What are the main approaches to the concept? Do they emanate from the democratic theory or the global system theory?
3. Where is the “non-Western other” in the theoretical mapping of global democracy? Is democracy a global issue in the true sense and what does it mean to be global? Or is it just another expression that focuses on domestic politics in the West, i.e. in industrial capitalist democratic systems, states and societies?
4. Do we need to re-conceptualize or redefine the concept based on attributes ascribed to it in literature? How can we do that? What is the comparable or alternative concept of democracy emanating from an Islamic perspective? What is the alternative vision of the world, global reform and the objectives of this reform?

The study comprises of three parts:

**Part One:** Global Democracy? Why a Re-conceptualization of Global Democracy is Needed?

**Part Two:** Are Debates on Islam and Democracy dealing with Global Aspects?

This part introduces the theorizing of the relationship between Islam and democracy from the West of the Muslim world. This issue is not new. In fact it generated continuous debates, in which various intellectual and political trends contributed, invoking tradition, history, thought, philosophy, law, sociology and making this issue a distinguished issue drawing the attention of Islamic studies and modern social studies interested in the role of Islam and its impact on social phenomena, such as development, human rights, war and peace and, of course, democracy. Therefore, part two of this study seeks to answer the following questions:

*First:* What is and how can we explain the divergence among Islamic trends and schools of thought concerning the relationship between Islam and democracy?

*Second:* Do Islamic literature on authority in general and governance in Islam in particular make reference to the international dimension or

the international environing context? Compared with traditional Islamic political thought?

*Third:* What is the pattern of linkage between the domestic and the foreign in Islamic visions concerning Islam and democracy in contemporary international system, either on the level of policies and movement or the level of theory and thinking (theoretical and intellectual level).

The study aspires, by linking part one and two, to demonstrate that the notion of democracy advanced in specialized Western literature is not the only conception possible, even if the Islamic notions are still confined to Islamic studies, Middle Eastern studies and missing the comparative Islamic perspective .

### **Part Three:** Global Change for Human Justice

This part introduces a vision that goes beyond the traditional binaries: Western/Islamic, Theory/Thought, and Reality/values. It also builds upon the stated criticism directed at the notion of global democracy from within the Western paradigms, particularly directed at the liberal perspective from the critical theory and the constructivist theory. This part also shed the light on the contribution of previous efforts aiming at providing a critical perspective from

within the Islamic civilizational paradigm either from within political theory in general or democracy theory in particular.

Therefore, this vision provides a thesis on human justice as an end for a global change from within an Islamic frame of reference, that is to say it links democracy to a search in its intentions and purpose.

*What is meant here by an Islamic paradigm of IR is:*

The Islamic paradigm of IR is a normative paradigm of special nature. What makes this paradigm special from its Western counterparts is the distinguished nature of its sources and genesis (origins). This special nature also arises from the difference in the frame of reference.

It offers a different / normative account of what international IR theory is about. This normative nature is manifested in the methodology, tools, assumptions, hypotheses concerning the basic aspects of the study of IR: the origin and the driving forces behind international actions, main actors, unit of analysis, level of analysis, processes, issues, interactions, the relations between the domestic and the international and between the material and the moral in explaining events and developments.

This paradigm represents a comparative cumulative trend in IR through the thick engagement of the Islamic experience on various levels: epistemological, intellectual, historical. Crucially, this paradigm offers a remedy for the crisis arising from employing the paradigm approach as the organizing schema in the scientific study of IR.

The Islamic paradigm offers a comprehensive perspective of the international phenomenon combining the material and the moral and the domestic and the international and the rational and the normative. Therefore, it offers a comprehensive view pertaining to the content and methodology of IR that goes beyond the aforementioned binaries.

***Part One: Global Democracy? Why a Re-conceptualization of Global Democracy is Needed?***

Reading through the Western literature under the title Global Democracy as well as related subtitles presented a two-way road. On one way, there is a trend discussing the globalization of democracy and on the other was the democratization of globalization or democratic globalization. The first trend tackles the challenges of achieving local democracy thanks to globalization. The second trend represents the challenges that globalization presents in building democracy on the global scale<sup>(10)</sup>.

The two trends indicate that the imperatives of dealing with the fusion of the internal and external in the relationship between globalization and democracy do not lead to an actual fusion.

In the two cases, there is an implicit or explicit assumption that democracies (especially liberal democracies) face challenges and incentives to systematically rethink the concept of democracy in a new phase of theorizing for liberal democracies<sup>(11)</sup>. At same time, liberalism claims

the necessity of spreading its norms and values globally in order to achieve democratic peace.

Discerning these two trends in the literature on global democracy indicates that there is not only the absence of actual fusion between the internal and external in probing the relationship between globalization and democracy, but also and more fundamentally, there is no consensus over the concept of global democracy.

Thus, the literature on globalization is divided between two trends in terms of defining and constructing the concept of global democracy. It also brought forth a two-level structure

**The first level** defines the dimensions of the debate and its content and assesses its novelty. In other words, how does the literature approach democracy as a global concept and global process and deal with the globalization of democracy as practices, procedures performed by new actors and according to new agenda.

**The second level** deals with global democracy on the philosophical level. What is the purpose of this global democracy and what is the purpose of this democratic globalization. Is it for global change or transformation? Is it for reforming the global system (macro- level)? Or is it intended to achieve peace and prevent wars and push forward the process of development (micro-

level). Who would benefit from global democracy? Where is the “non-Western” in this picture? Does it occupy a prominent place in the various IR paradigms, either as a subject of globalized interactions and its impact on emerging democracies emulating or replicating the Western experience or as traditional or new actors?

**The first level: Aspects of the debates on Global democracy<sup>(12)</sup>**

The point of departure in discussing the notion of global democracy within IR theory is to draw a map of global transformations that influenced the degree of democracy in the global system or democracy in the nation-states.

The situation in the international system suggests that a lot of policies vital to the lives of individuals are being determined without any input from those individuals. These policies can not be considered legitimate because they lack democratic measures necessary to become legitimate<sup>(13)</sup>. Therefore, some observers describe this situation as a “democratic deficit on the global level”. This deficit is multi-facet. Steve Charnovitz identified some of these facets such as: the lack of democracy in managing international organizations, international law and



treaties do not oblige member states to adopt democracy domestically. Consequently, the governments of member states do not reflect the will and the desires of their people. Membership in international organizations are limited to nation-states and not open to peoples. Participation is often limited to consultation, i.e. Participation is limited to decision-making and not decision-taking<sup>(14)</sup>. Therefore, some observers concluded that “there is no democratic alternative to global democracy”<sup>(15)</sup>.

Taking to pieces the logic behind this notion leads us to recognize a number of issues raised in the western literature on global democracy. For instance, the new reality of the global system compels us to rethink new approach of managing the interactions in the globalized global system. Does this new reality necessitate a new world order? Have the new world order already materialized to reflect the new global reality? If the answer to this question is yes, what is the structure of this new order? Is global democracy the optimal structure of this new world order? Again, if the answer is yes, how can we bring about global democracy?

As for the aspects of the debates on global democracy in western literature, they revolved around a number of issues:

1. *The future of the world*, or more accurately the state of international relations. Does it represent a state of anarchy that cannot be mitigated? This issue raises another concern in the literature, that is, the relations between democracy and the state of international relations<sup>(16)</sup>.
2. *The types of issues* that can be addressed through global democracy. State sovereignty as an international principle stands as an obstacle to the application of global democracy. The possibility of the democratic administration of global issues is obstructed by the structure of the global balance of power, which have a bearing on the reality and outcome of administering various global issues as in the case of defense and nuclear proliferation issues. However, there is a possibility of applying global democracy in cases such as public health for instance. Global democracy can be realized more easily in issues that require violating the sovereignty of small states than in issues that violate the sovereignty of great powers. In a nutshell, are we talking about international system or world order based on state-actors and hard power? Or are we talking about an international or global public sphere? This brings us to the relationship between ideas and norms and between the existing structures of material power globally<sup>(17)</sup>.

3. Another issue raised in the literature is *the suitability of applying democracy on the global level* because democracy, basically for liberals, is closely associated with the state. Susan Marks described the state as the “container” of democracy<sup>(18)</sup>. So no matter how important it is, democracy can not be separated from the state because the state gives a meaning to the principle “rule by the people”. There must be “people” to rule. Who are to be considered the people on the global level?<sup>(19)</sup> On the other hand, Habermas believes that “the container has been breached” and that democracy can not be limited to the state level in the age of globalization<sup>(20)</sup>. David Held observed what he described as a move toward global governance<sup>(21)</sup>. According to Held the world is living through a transition from the Westphalian system to post-Westphalian system<sup>(22)</sup>. We are confronted with two issues. First which comes first: democracy or the people? According to Cohen and Sabel, no demos, no democracy<sup>(23)</sup>. The second issue: which comes first: domestic democracy or global democracy?
4. The literature on democracy discusses *the democratic process*, which brings us to the heart of the debate between liberal, globalist, constructivist, critical and realist theorists.

International liberal theorists focus on the democratization of traditional inter-governmental institutions (old multilateralism)<sup>(24)</sup>. Globalists focus on a reformist agenda; a global democracy that goes beyond inter-governmental organizations to include new form of international organizations (such as the International Criminal Court), in which citizens are empowered vis-à-vis nation-states in order to become cosmopolitan citizens (new multilateralism), and in which citizens are granted equal opportunity to participate politically domestically and internationally<sup>(25)</sup>. Constructivists focus on dialogic communities capable of constructing common values and identities through dialogue. According to constructivists global change “may weave among paths rather than speeding down regulated highways”<sup>(26)</sup>. Critical theorists focus on unconventional power structures that are not fixed on the international system level. These new structure are fundamentally different from the structures of democratic governance within nation-states. John Dryzek describes these structures as being the outcome of global interactions on the level of global civil society and the public sphere<sup>(27)</sup>. Realists criticize constructivists because they see no meaning in

trying to “construct” an international system. According to Realists, the international system-like any other social system- is the outcome of interactions among people without being made by them<sup>(28)</sup>.

Where can we have global democracy? in inter-governmental organizations or regional institutions and entities? Global groups such the G-8?<sup>(29)</sup> Or global civil society or the transnational public sphere<sup>(30)</sup>, in which we can utilize popular referenda or electing representatives to represent global peoples and through processes of deliberations<sup>(31)</sup>. Deliberative democracy as based on public reasoning<sup>(32)</sup>. Some argue that democracy can applied on these various level. This idea was expressed by Boutros Ghali- the former secretary general of the United Nations<sup>(33)</sup>. It is very important to notice that the above-mentioned debates reveal the interdisciplinary nature of the concept of global democracy.

In short, what is meant by global democracy? Is it cosmopolitan democracy or transnational democracy or supranational democracy? Or does it mean “democratic regionalism”, that is, according to Habermas, the re-aggregation of political authority at the level that goes beyond the national frame but pulls up short of the

global”. The European Union is a model to be emulated in democratic coordination between countries in order to tackle global issues<sup>(34)</sup>.

This pluralism in defining global democracy, what does it implicate? Does it reflect incoherence due to differences in paradigms and approaches? This raises the issue of the diversity that might be add to this debate due to contribution from non-western civilizational paradigms.

The question remains: is it really a “global” democracy? What is new in all these debates compared to their predecessors? This bring us to the second level of the analysis in part.

## **The Second Level: The West and The Rest in Global Democracy: What is New?**

The attempt to achieve democracy on the global level is not new as some might claim. This is not just an outcome of globalization. We can say that the United Nations Charter was an attempt to institute a form of global democracy on the international level. Classic literature also talked about the concept such as the writings of Grocius and the idea of global government adopted by many thinkers as the only way to avoid a third, possibility nuclear, world war. The notion has also been discussed in some of the Realist literature such as the writings of Reinhold, Niebuhr, Morgenthau. They all agreed in the sixties that a global state is a logical necessity. After the Cold War, especially in the last decade, the idea of global democracy is again being reiterated in the writing to Alexander Wendt who considered instituting global government “inevitable” as it “the way to deal with global problems that governments are incapable of dealing with”<sup>(35)</sup>. But what is new now? For what purpose? And who would benefit from the dialogue and endeavors aiming at instituting global democracy?<sup>(36)</sup>

The above-mentioned questions raise the issue of the democratic value system that need to be

globalized. Does it rely upon liberal democratic values based on human rights, capitalism and western value system? If this is the case, democracy would mean that the West is capable of teaching and directing the Rest. Or is liberalism based on pluralism, difference, and the liberal toleration of others<sup>(37)</sup>. Then liberalism will be one of the components of this new value system to administer the world, but it also includes and learns from the values and experiences of the rest of the world and the world would benefit from the western values and experience<sup>(38)</sup>.

The debate surrounding the values and ethical principles in international relations manifest itself in the debate surrounding the concept of global democracy.

Scholars, like Barry Holden, envisage that global democracy depends for its existence to some extent on the existence of global community. However, the processes of globalization and taking serious measures to promote global democracy could encourage the formation of this community. Holden's notion on global democracy is based upon cosmopolitan perspective of values. There are values that can be agreed upon internationally. Reaching a consensus over these values can be reached



through effective participation on the part of the individuals in thinking and discourse over these values. On the other hand, some embrace the communitarian perspective of values and ethical principles based on a relativist perspective based on the view that values are cultural specific. This perspective is accepted by the realists as well as the pluralists from the English school of IR such as Hedley Bull. They both reject the idea of global common values shared by various civilizations and cultures. According to Realists, global values are attempts to impose the western values, especially individualism, on the rest of the world, which leads, according to realists, to a backlash and communitarian integration, instead of consolidating global culture and common values, leading to instability on the international level because common values are very limited.

Cosmopolitanism for the empowerment of the individuals negates the charge of trying to impose liberal values on the rest of the world. Empowering the individuals permits them to express their values freely<sup>(39)</sup>.

On the other hand, there are those, like Tony Coates, who reject all forms of universalism because of its adverse effects on local communities and culture. This confirms a stark difference between the ideas of the

enlightenment age with its underlying modern cosmopolitanism and between the ideas of pre-enlightenment age on natural law. The later is trying to reconcile between the human unity and differences in cultural and moral values, recognizing the moral universalism of the normative unity of mankind. This notion is indirectly based on a Christian frame of reference. It believes in the moral nature and moral unity of humans without embracing moral imperialism. Coates notes that the non-enlightenment tradition of natural law as being universalist without being cosmopolitan<sup>(40)</sup> (this notion is the closest to the Islamic perspective regarding this matter).

Patomaki observed that the renewed attention given to the issue of “global democracy” in the 1980s was coupled with globalization<sup>(41)</sup>. Globalization influenced trends in social and political theorizing, especially in the aftermath of the Cold War.

Patomaki discerns between three trends:

*First:* the Kantian-Habermasian trend expressed in the work of Habermas and David Held<sup>(42)</sup>. This trend presents the cosmopolitan democracy based on the European experience. Habermas believes that democratization of the European Union will lead to the rise of a balancing power

to American unipolar hegemony and this will, in turn, lead to global democracy.

*Second* is the post-structural trend<sup>(43)</sup>. This trend is skeptical about cosmopolitan democracy, which it considers as a new political trend. Considering it universal make it very dangerous because it discriminate against the “Other” around the world. Because it means that the other should adopt this model and join the cosmopolitan democratic community or be excluded as the non-democratic other, as a threat and a possible enemy, thus coercive power will be then needed to protect this cosmopolitan democratic community.

*Third* trend is the pragmatist<sup>(44)</sup> and critical realist trend<sup>(45)</sup>, which sees cosmopolitan democracy as an open democracy based on trans-cultural dialogue, bottom-up reforms and concrete utopians. There is no one model that encompasses all these democratic capabilities, therefore, it is necessary to strive for more democracy so countries do not go astray under the pressure of corruption and the concentration of power. Patomaki concludes by recommending that the non-European “other” be given the chance to present their own initiatives rooted in their experiences, visions and expectations.

Based on this intra-western dialogue, we can say that the liberal standpoint concerning global democracy is mainly a response to the crisis facing western democracies as a consequence to global transformations and their internal side-effects. Therefore, this standpoint is just another phase of western adaptation to deal with the recurring democratic crises in order to promote democracy as the other face of peace that should be en(forced) on others. Non-western others are non-existent on the map of this trend, except as a subject and object because they are not democratic and because they lack the power to advance and internationalize their notion of democracy, either through dialogue or practice. Non-western others endure wars in the name of democracy to become universal. But can this imposed democracy solve their problems? What is the form of this imposed democracy?

What is the purpose of democracy? Prevent wars or achieve justice?

Under the title: “Cosmopolitan Democracy and Its Discontent”, Archibugi present a general and comprehensive review of the criticism directed at cosmopolitan democracy<sup>(46)</sup>. He asks whether global democracy is the approach for peaceful conflict resolution that completely excludes wars as an option according to the pluralist liberal

tradition and whether the absence of war is a prerequisite for promoting democracy globally. Hence, on the one side, the issue of war and peace and its relationship to democracy: Which pave the way for the other? And on the other side, the issue of global conflict and international anarchy and its impact on democracy are two sides of the same coin.

The main message of Archibugi is his criticism to liberal thought. This criticism is from within the western civilization directed at one of its currents, a product of the same western imagination, reflecting its problems and its status in the world. But non-westerns are not present in this debate.

The debate reveals a group of dualities/ binaries included in one comprehensive framework related to the relationship between liberal democracy and issue of peace and war prevention such as:

- Internal/ external
- Democracy/war prevention
- Nations/states
- The norms of global democracy (procedures) / the philosophy of democracy (cultural specificities).

These binaries invoke a group of questions concerning their relevance to another non-western civilizational paradigm or their counterparts in a paradigm emanating from a different civilizational experience. What is the purpose? Is it war prevention? Can we consider the different, non-western, non-democratic other the enemy? What the priority: to ward off aggression and occupation, or changing authoritarian regimes? Is possible to think of domestic attributes (democracy or the lack thereof) as the main determinant of war and peace?

Is representative democracy the archetype of democracy that must be spread globally? Or must democracy reflect local conditions? Who is intended from this message: states or individuals? What is the relationship between the domestic and the foreign?

In order words, does the Islamic civilizational paradigm repeat these binaries in one way or another? Or does it move beyond these binaries in order to achieve a great degree of harmony, coordination and reconciliation and overcome conflict and contradiction suggested by these binaries? These binaries make global democracy, under the current conditions of

global cultural hegemony, old wine in new bottles.

What does the literature present to mitigate this bias? And how?

I suggest here to explore different purposes for global democracy. I choose to put it under the title: from war and peace to social and economic justice.

At this junction, it is important to note that the western literature include other perspectives critical of the traditional paradigm of international relations, which aims at preserving the international hegemonic status quo. This critical turn in IR, which is more open and plural, addresses the notion of democracy in international relations and not just global liberal democracy. This type of literature is more concerned with problems facing nations as a result of economic and social globalization more than issues of war and peace between nation-states. A sample of these studies is included in a special issue of the periodical published by the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences.

The first under the title: “Globalization and Democracy: New Great Transformation?”<sup>(47)</sup>, in which R. Munck tackles the negative and positive side-effects of globalization for

democracy. He bases his argument on the thesis of Polanyi and his book on great transformations. He discusses the dual trend toward market expansion on the one hand and the increasing social control over this expansion on the other. He concluded that globalization creates an evolving process of social exclusion inside and among states. At the same time, it creates new anti-globalization and pro-democratization social movements.

Munck's thesis on democracy and globalization is more critical than H.Teune's thesis<sup>(48)</sup>. Teune focused on the processes of globalization that have pushed toward democracy and openness since 1970s. Political democratic structures became necessary for maintenance of political systematic processes of globalization. Democracy is needed for the maintenance of globalization as the proper approach to achieve the promised prosperity. The liberal thesis makes cosmopolitan democracy as a pre-condition for economic globalization that achieves global welfare (according to neoliberalism) because welfare cannot reach everyone without democracy and not just representative democracy but democracy normatively associated with human rights.



More critically, For B.K.Gills globalization requires a new political system necessary for the stability of global economic liberalism<sup>(49)</sup>.

Therefore, there is a need for a balance between the Marxist, Liberal and Realist paradigm. An alternative world order requires the democratization of globalization and the globalization of democracy. It also calls for new radical concepts on citizenship practices and bridging the gap between local, national, regional and international spaces. It necessitates breaking the iron cage of traditional paradigms because no matter how much they differ; they still reflect the inherent international power structure embedded in the international system.

To recap: the debates concerning global democracy is basically a debate over the “philosophy”, value-system and the global purpose of this democracy. These debates take place within western epistemology. There were also calls for criticizing and rejecting this dominant western paradigm based on power structures and hegemonic patterns of interactions.

This part of the study provides an introduction necessary to position an “Islamic perspective” on the map of these debates. It provides an alternative perspective for global democracy

contributing to the reconstruction of the concept from an Islamic paradigm of IR. This perspective weaves together these revisions in a comprehensive view that thickly engage religion as frame of reference. Religion, not as a creed limited to believers, but as a source of ethical norms and principles that can, when put into practice, serve humanity.

The concept of global democracy can act as a melting pot to compile the various revisions scattered among various disciplines and sciences to construct a new concept with new dimensions. This concept does not mix between goals and tools. That is to say, if the goal is global democracy, the tool cannot be global democracy, but global change that promotes human justice.



## ***Part Two: Do Debates on Islam and Democracy Deal with Global Aspects?***

There is a great different between mapping the intellectual and theoretical trends dealing with the relationship between Islam and democracy- which reflect the traditional perspective in western scholarship in Islam or social scientific studies that use Islam as one of its variables and between theorizing for major political and social concepts, including the concept of democracy and the development of global democracy, from an Islamic perspective that reflects the Islamic experience and current realities. This new trend represents a major impetus for change in the modern social literature since the last decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century until now (for example, the series of Religion, Culture and International Relations<sup>(50)</sup> and the work of Armando Salvatore<sup>(51)</sup>).

The analysis in the first part showed that the world of Islam is absent to a large extent from the debates over global democracy. But it is also important to note that this concept did not receive a proper attention in the Islamic scholarship. For us it is an “imported concept”. It is not enough to “consume” or “emulate”

without any input from our part. Also, our governments and peoples were politically and intellectually occupied with the consequences of globalization and democratization. Political and intellectual movements in the South focused on globalization and democratization. Thus, it is very important to think – from outside the West – about this concept and its implications: political and intellectual; internal and external.

In order to answer the three questions raised in the introduction, we need to take into consideration the following methodological factors:

1. Since we are talking about global democracy, we cannot be limited to political Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*) (which focuses on domestic issues), but we need to broaden our scope to include the *fiqh* of international relations in Islam and the contribution of the Islamic tradition.
2. The issue of democracy in the Muslim world is not only a theoretical and intellectual issue but also a practical issue in terms of policies and programs shaped by external pressures and internal challenges under the impact of globalization.

3. It is very important to consider the pattern of relationship between the domestic and the foreign both theoretically and politically.

**The first level:**

Secular trends are biased against domestic and international Islamic political *fiqh*, which they distort as they reject any role for Islam in domestic and international politics. The attack on Muslims and Islam focused on accuses of authoritarianism, terrorism, and intolerance.

But there has been genuine critical revisions and *ijtihad* that presented alternative analyses on the nature of authority in Islam, international relations and the relationship between the domestic and the foreign as follows:

First: a number of scholars<sup>(52)</sup> attempted to reveal the bias against Islamic political jurisprudence which was accused of supporting authoritarianism and preserving the status quo. The critical view reject these accusations based on no methodological verification and without discerning between the rule and the exception, the absolute and the relative. Obedience in Islamic jurisprudence has ultimate goals and not an end in itself. Obedience is the means to achieve collective good and stability of the

political life. But The rule of obedience is not enforced in the case of the dictator.

Second: New research trends are calling for rephrasing the question on the nature of relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims in order for the Islamic perspective of IR go beyond the war/peace duality<sup>(53)</sup>, as we shall see in the third part. As an example, we will explore two issues here.

The first is the issue of jihad, which is used by some to accuse Islam of exclusionary and discriminatory vision and accuse Islamic jurisprudence of manipulating the reality in order to legitimize jihad. It is important at this point to refer to Bernard Lewis's viewpoint<sup>(54)</sup>. He provided an explanation for the rise and fall of Islamic power based on domestic factors and European encroachment. He also discusses the rotation of power from the Arabs to the Turks. He calls to mind the role played by various Muslim nations. In his call, we need to distinguish between pluralism and complementarity and between pinpointing patterns of divisions and conflicts.

The second issue is the issue of *Shariah*. *Shariah* includes the norms, principles and fundamentals upon which theorizing for international relations in Islam is based<sup>(55)</sup>. It is important note that

these norms, principles and fundamentals are stable, enduring and comprehensive. Therefore, they encompass the ultimate criteria for evaluating the Islamic perspective on relations among nations. There are various classifications for these principles and norms<sup>(56)</sup>, but they can be categorized as: foundational values: the oneness of God, purification of the soul, civility and justice. Fundamental values: calling to Allah and jihad. Civilizational values: pluralism, diversity, acquaintance (getting to know one another), dialogue and fraternity in humanity.

A trend of positive Orientalism<sup>(57)</sup> (such as the work of Marcel Boisard) contributed to the study of the value system behind jihad and the division of the world into *Dar al Selm* (abode of peace) *Dar al Harb* (abode of war). The entire structure of Islam, which is considered the religion of "humanity", is penetrated by this value system<sup>(58)</sup>. Boisard's approach to Islam is a humanistic civilizational approach that begins with the individual, then the community and end with the world. He presents a critical intellectual normative reading of the general jurisprudence as well as specific rules pertaining to foreign relations in times of war and peace. This is not a pure normative or juristic reading, but a normative realist approach presenting Islamic



centrism as the foundation of the Islamic view of the world. It is a humanitarian vision but does not exclude or prohibit power and war when necessary. However the use of force and war is regulated in order to become a civilized practice. Third: What about the problematic relationship between the domestic and the foreign in the foundational Islamic texts and Islamic thought as well as in Islamic history?

Regarding Islamic history, some wonder how some generalize corruption and authoritarianism as prevalent features in the entire Islamic history without differentiating between times of power, unity, expansion and times of weakness, regression, division and occupation. How can we explain ten centuries of progress under authoritarianism and corruption? What about the societal balance of power and the roles played by various societal powers?<sup>(59)</sup> At that time, jihad played an important role in struggling against corruption and authoritarianism bolstered by an internal framework supporting this function. More significantly, what about the external factor in this picture?<sup>(60)</sup> When and how this factor took the form of foreign powers interfering to support authoritarian regimes and at the same time claim to promote modernity and enlightenment to our societies.

As for Islamic political thought, traditional or modern, the literature review<sup>(61)</sup> confirms that Islamic political thought focused mainly on the relationship between the ruler and the ruled in domestic politics. Despite the importance of the external dimension and its effects, Islamic political thought continued to consider the external as just an extension of the internal.

Therefore, it is very important to search in the history of international Islamic thought, in terms of its issues and concepts in order to discover the main characteristics of the civilizational route defining the development of Islamic thinking.

The international relations issues for the Islamic 'Umma and the world are broader than just issues of war and peace to include- according to Quranic vision- human and civilizational issue in general. Complex issues such as acquaintance, civility, dialectical power relations that do not necessarily lead to conflict...etc. consequently; we cannot approach these civilizational issues- in the broadest sense- depending on Islamic jurisprudence alone. We need a more comprehensive approaches, such as the ultimate goals of the *shariah*, divine universal laws (which can be compared to nature law), and values based on fundamental creed (comprehensive vision). In other words, the *fiqh*

of war, peace and jihad has another aspect to it presented by the philosophers and intellectuals of Islam. This aspect is based on the world view of Islam and its associated values<sup>(62)</sup>.

**The Second Level: Mapping the Trends Concerning Globalization and Democracy from an Islamic perspective: Toward Islamic Universalism and Islamic Democracy**

We can infer the Islamic viewpoints on globalization and democratization (whether transferred or imposed from the outside) from the general framework and context of reviewing Islamic political jurisprudence. The earlier debates on Islamic view of the world, political authority and the relation with the other were renewed in new outfit since the end of the Cold War.

Because of our concern with the map of Islamic intellectual interaction, it is worth mentioning that on the one side, cultural aspects became the focal point when we talk about globalization, and on the other hand, these aspects are also invoked when we talk about democracy. Democracy is not necessarily global and therefore it does reflect civilization-specific aspects, especially that religion plays a pivotal role in the Islamic political culture.

The impact of globalization on Islam and Muslims as well as the impact of democracy on the culture and institutions of democracy are the two sides of the same coin. They both stirred important debates as follows:

- Democracy should be secular and therefore Islam is incompatible with liberal democracy or democracy can embrace religion and the secular liberal model of democracy can not be universal and Islam can be compatible with democracy<sup>(63)</sup>.
- Globalization represents a threat to Muslim identity and culture and therefore we need to contain its manifestations. It carries positive aspects that Muslims should benefit from. For example, on the cultural front, cultures grow and need to be open to and interact with other cultures without worrying about its hard core values that distinguish one culture from another<sup>(64)</sup>.

This brief map reflects a pattern of binaries that dominated the debates over globalization and democracy from an Islamic perspective.

There a possibility of an alternative Islamic view on democracy, or globalization or their interactions that goes beyond these binaries and thus presents a more comprehensive and complex viewpoint emanating from the

characteristics of Islamic civilizational paradigm of international relations previously mentioned in the introduction.

**First: Aspects of a Comprehensive View on Globalization**

In the second half of the 1990s, the Arab and Islamic arena was full of diverse cases of anti-globalization discourse, which failed to understand globalization and its consequences, and did not express a comprehensive perspective on globalization and its relevant issues<sup>(65)</sup>.

Hence it is methodologically necessary to distinguish between three levels: *first* the revolution in information and telecommunications which characterizes contemporary IR and which cannot be denied or refused, *second*: globalization as “ideology” which can be assessed, since it is viewed as the inclination of a specific cultural model to dominate, and *third* the level of “policies” which aim at setting global rules and order in various fields.

Muslim perspectives on globalization are related to the challenges imposed by globalization politics and the search for an alternative. These Muslim perspectives are value-based perspectives which seek to address

the renewal of interest in the cultural- religious aspects of globalization, and the significance of this focus with regard to the challenges imposed by globalization on the Muslim world.

An Islamic perspective believes in the overlapping of the economic, political and cultural aspects of the globalization processes, and perceives these processes not as newly emerging processes, but as continuous and extended<sup>(66)</sup>.

The analysis also addresses the problematic of comparing (globalization) with (Islamic universalism)<sup>(67)</sup>. This comparison reflects the difference between the coercive compulsory mechanism to impose one cultural model, and the optional mechanisms of spreading a model that admits variety as a divine wisdom in building societies.

In sum, the literature expressing Islamic perspectives on globalization includes three basic dimensions<sup>(68)</sup>:

- 1- the way Muslims can present a cultural perspective to restore balance in international relations.
- 2- a normative paradigm that admits cultural pluralism and recognition not standardization.

- 3- Emphasizing the role of religion in providing the ethical basis of interaction between states (which is shared with various Western theoretical schools.)

**Second: A vision of Islamic Democracy: Why? And How?**

My approach to the so called Islamic Democracy as it relates to the International Relations discipline<sup>(69)</sup> evolves around three issues:

First: Which interpretations of Islam, which Muslims and which democracy?

The question provokes a normative reflection that go beyond the question of compatibility, which reflects a revision of the modern secular concept of democracy and the need to take into consideration the genuine characteristics of Muslim societies. The concern with the views of Muslims towards democracy imply that Muslims, whatever their nationalities are, constitute a social – cultural – civilizational entity (the al-'Umma) where the bond of Islam would have an impact on the way they view democracy.

Second: The internal and external context of the democratization crisis (What characteristics, where, and when):

Democratization has turned out to be an area of conflict or dialogue between cultures and religions, and has raised the problematic of particularity versus universality.

The battle for democracy in the Muslim world has acquired global aspects due to foreign interventions in the name of democracy. It is sometimes a violent process, where foreign military force is used to impose liberal democracy or where Muslim governments use violence to exclude opposition.

Liberal democracy comes at the expense of social justice and welfare issues and excludes religion and identity issues, and the human rights approach to democracy has been introduced at the expense of religious particularity and national cohesion. At the same time the rights of minorities have been manipulated for political goals in the name of humanitarian intervention (Iraq under the American occupation is the most illustrative case).



In sum, the context of democratization in the Muslim world is marked by military occupation, re-division of nation-states on sectarian bases, capital dominance and social injustice, threat to cultural and religious values, marginalization of opposition forces, double standards, superficial selective reform and unfair and constrained elections.

**Third: What type of democracy is needed? Is "Islamic democracy" missing in the debate?**

Absence of consensus between opposition forces on the needed type of democracy is a major obstacle to democratization in the Muslim world. While some argue that the non-democratic systems are a product of apathy of people attributed –partly- to Islam, others explain that the failure of reform initiatives along the past two centuries is due to imposed (secular reform) under colonialism.

**Hence, what about Islamic democracy?**

The question remains how can the respect of identity and specificity be an approach for political, social and cultural change? How can

the religious discourse encourage pluralism, diversity and acquaintance? How can political Islamic trends be a partner in the political process? How can Islamic relief movements become developmental movements supporting human rights?<sup>(70)</sup>

Lastly, how is the mainstream in the national community or what it is called the historical bloc formed? Why is the issue of Islamic democracy not raised?<sup>(71)</sup> How can we change the course of foreign interventions?

It is necessary to reset the agendas of cooperation with the civil society as well as the agenda for dialogue in order to give priority to more comprehensive issues, such as:

- Mobilization and participation in the public sphere to shatter apathy among people and not just building the capacity of the elite.
- Change the perception of people who reject the role of religion in the public sphere as anti-democratic. Rethink the way through which religion can mobilize civic capacities for social and political change.
- Support the sustainable dialogue among various intellectual and political trends in

- order to build national consensus necessary for building the historical bloc.
- Civil society studies excluded from the civil everything that is religious or violent (even if it was legitimate). Reviewing these studies from an Arab and Islamic perspective reveals that this exclusion is in itself a bias toward the Western experience<sup>(72)</sup>. The religious is civil at heart, which means that we need to redefine the civil in order to include the religious and reconstruct the concept of the global civil society. Can we imagine more than one global civil society or a complex global civil society that is not uniform? Can the Muslim transnational civil society (as a part of the 'Umma) be considered one of the components of this complex global civil society? Where does it intersect normatively with other?

On the other hand, there are manifestations for the concept of “citizenship” and “human rights” in the Islamic tradition<sup>(73)</sup> and are expressed in a scheme of concepts such as pluralism and centrism on the level of *fiqh*, thought, and historical practices. It is also expressed in the Islamic view of the world. The contemporary

literature on human rights in Islam supports and confirms the attributes of civility and pluralism and the tenets of the human rights of the “other” based on the religious frame of reference. It also presents a unique pattern of the relationship among the individual, society and state, bringing into play the religious (Islam) as the basis for civility based on justice.

At this juncture, we reached the same conclusion of the first part that the concept of global democracy needs reconstructing as well as coin alternative and parallel concepts necessary for cross-cultural dialogue on how to change people’s and world conditions. Some support the initiative of global civil society and some speak of the global public sphere as forums and critical frameworks to achieve cross-cultural, cross-civilizational interactions dealing with issues of concern to the entire humanity. Susan Buck-Morss states that<sup>(74)</sup>:

What this means is that democracy on a global scale necessitates producing solidarity beyond and across the discursive terrains that determine our present collective identifications. The goal is not to “understand” some “other” discourse, emanating from a “civilization” that is intrinsically different from “our own”. Nor is it merely organizational, to form pragmatic,

interest-driven alliances among pre-defined and self-contained groups. Much less is it to accuse a part of the polity of being backward in its political beliefs, or worse, the very embodiment of evil. Rather, what is needed is to rethink the entire project of politics within the changed conditions of a global public sphere – and to do this democratically, as people who speak different political languages, but whose goals are nonetheless the same.

While each stratum of the global public sphere struggles for coherence, the whole is marked by contradictions. We coexist immanently, within the same discursive space but without mutual comprehension, lacking the shared cultural apparatus necessary to sustain sociability. But there is no option except the slow and painful task of a radically open communication that does not presume that we already know where we stand.

### **The Third Level: How can we participate in this dialogue?**

There are various viewpoints on the part of Muslim scholars on the possibility and the necessity of the participation of Islamic views in “repairing the world”. In this regard, I will

mention three models: Hamed Rabi'e, Mona Abu El Fadl and Ahmed Dawud Oghlo<sup>(75)</sup>.

These views tackle two interrelated issues of special interest. On the one hand, the world needs an Islamic model to participate in global intellectual and societal renewal. Intellectual and epistemological renewal on the level of the 'Umma, based on Islamic frame of reference is a necessary condition to strengthen the 'Umma and can contribute to world peace and stability on the other hand.

The two questions show that Islam can make a significant contribution to the world, but it is more important to solve the problems of the 'Umma based on its fixed civilizational foundations and its open model of acquaintance and communication based on its tradition of pluralism and diversity. In other words, based on the nature of Islamic centrism and that it is a call for the universe, on the one hand and based on the historical experience of the Muslim 'Umma whether in time of power or weakness, on the other hand, one can say that there is a connection between what Islam can offer to Muslims and what it can offer to the world. My answer to the question- the title of this study- is based on this connection. This connection was expressed in

the work of the following three intellectual models:

**The first model** is presented in the work of Prof. Hamed Rabi'e: *Toward a Revolution of the 21 century: Islam and International Powers*, published in 1981<sup>(76)</sup>.

This book reflects importance of the international aspect in the current chapter of the lives of Muslim peoples. It also did not neglect the "domestic" with its opportunities and capabilities. He confirms that Islam has a capability to resist neo-colonialism and its mechanisms that negatively affect civilizational self-confidence.

**The second model** is presented in the work of Prof. Mona Abu El Fadl. In her study on "Islam as a cultural power for global renewal"<sup>(77)</sup>, she stressed the connection between the need of the 'Umma for intellectual renewal and the capacity of Islam to contribute to international intellectual renewal. She said that it because global transformations in general and because Islamic awakening in particular, Islamism is considered a vital response to our 'Umma because cultural chaos, as a feature of our world, work as a coercive power on contemporary civilizations. Islam has been always a driving force for cultural and civilizational renewal through

history in various parts of the world. Therefore, bridging the current gap between cultures is necessary for the intellectual renewal of the 'Umma in order to renew its identity and solve its problems. This cultural renewal is an integral part of the global cultural renewal that all cultures need, whether dominant or subordinate. Prof. Abu El Fadl sees the Islamic paradigm as vocational ideal.

**The third model** is presented by the work of prof. Ahmed Oghlo in book *"Civilizational transformation and the Muslim world"*<sup>(78)</sup>, published in 1992 in English and has been translated into Arab by Dr. Ibrahim El Bayoumi Ghanem in 2006. Oghlo argues that the Islamic civilization has an obligation to provide solutions for contemporary world problems.

Prof. Oghlo believes that the current civilizational crisis experienced by the international system is not the first and will not be the last. Previous civilizational crises were overcome by spreading ethical standards and principles borrowed from other civilizations. What makes this crisis unique is that other cultures are not allowed to coexist and participate.



Prof. Oghlo provides ideas for prevail over the crisis in the current international system based on an Islamic perspective. This perspective has four approaches. Prof. Oghlo starts with how the Muslim perceives himself. Is he aware of himself or does he suffer alienation? Islamic epistemology is based on a fundamental assumption that all sources of knowledge, no matter how diverse they are, they are compatible with each other and consistent with the principle of the unity of God. The third approach tackles the role of the value system in organizing social life. The fourth approach focuses authenticity and cultural pluralism. He argues that the Muslims perception of society and history provides then with the psychological and social motives to preserve the core features of their civilization despite the encroachment from the western civilization.

*Obstacles to Participation of the Islamic Civilization in the Debate over “Global Democracy”:*

These obstacles is in part due to the fact that majority of Muslim countries are developing countries, where economics conditions and underdevelopment limit the ability of these countries to participate effectively in

administering the world. But participation is not the only indicator of democracy. These countries are low on choice, low on participation and low on democracy<sup>(79)</sup>. There is also the problem of the lack of democracy internally in these countries. How can participate in global democracy if there is no democracy internally? Is the outside responsible for the absence of democracy inside the Muslim world?

There are other obstacles that are in part related to participation from within Muslim states. Muslim states suffer from the widespread of negative stereotypes promoted by the practices of small Muslim minority. Muslim states suffer from authoritarianism and the lack of democracy on the domestic level. The majority of Muslim countries, and in particular Arab countries, practice a form of secular authoritarianism. Muslims also lack awareness of the essence of Islam and hence the capacity to transform it in a lived reality, focusing on its rituals and its external appearance. This secular authoritarianism resulted in a rupture in the structure of the Muslim 'Umma. When defining their identity, Muslim states exclude or relegate their Islamic identity, this in turn, inflame unwarranted conflicts among Muslim states.

Therefore, Muslims are trying to prove to the world- not just the West- that Islam has a lot to offer to world in terms of values and ideas. This contribution necessitates a process of self-critique of the Muslim conditions, the revival of Islamic vision of the world in the mind of Muslims before non-Muslims in order to be able to move beyond the spiritual and moral bankruptcy and moved beyond excessive violence and tyranny and the material definition of power that makes Muslim a marginal power in the world<sup>(80)</sup>. We are actually witnessing a double move toward self-critique, critique of modernization and positivist material view of the world.

Reforming the global system will allow Muslims to participate globally. Muslims have to tackle two problems related to the Mutual perception between Muslims and non-Muslims Muslims are part of the world and cannot be isolated and they have an obligation toward humanity not just to other Muslims. This role necessitates internal reform inside the Muslim world<sup>(81)</sup>.

Talking about accepting the other, embracing civilizational pluralism and paving the way for the contribution of marginalized circles, is very appealing. But it is necessary for the other to be interested in and able to participate. Interest and

ability have a lot to do with individual as well as the political system to which he belongs and what this system offers to empower the citizens. Otherwise, it would become another model of relations based on hegemony and dependency, albeit in a more legitimate and fashionable form



### ***Part Three: Global Justice, Human Security and Democracy: A Third Way.***

Based on the preceding argument, we may put forward our conception of the Islamic stance on Global Democracy. In doing so, we shall respond to two main questions:

*First:* is our goal the establishment of democracy both domestically and internationally or do we further hope for a radical change in global politics?

*Second:* Do we invoke Islam as a religious frame of reference for changing the world or do we rather want to use it as a tool to promote democracy or facilitate the democratic administration of the world.

I propose to forge my view of an Islamic perspective for changing the world and establishing global justice based on two results this research has hitherto reached:

*Firstly,* the rich scientific debate over global democracy currently preoccupying the western institution including universities, periodicals, research institutions and even research sponsor and patron institutions is concerned for the perspective of the non-western countries on democracy only to prove that the west accept

pluralism. As this debate continues to escalate, it reveals the crisis both the science of international relations and the political theory in general undergo. In this respect, it has become rather difficult to fully determine the space of agreement in any of these disputes; the concept under study requires a radical re-construction because there is a complete lack of agreement on its definition. Further, the Muslim world is an outsider relative to this debate; it does not actively participate in forging the concept of global democracy whether in terms of identifying the sources of its definition or delineating the range of its implications for the political theory.

*Second* and more importantly, there is a conflict interests. For instance, as Muslim political scientist, I am primarily concerned about the repercussions of importing democracy on the Muslim societies whereas my western colleagues are concerned about the problems that plague the practice and development of western democracy, its current status and the effects of globalization on such development. Further, western politicians are only concerned with the exportation of democracy to the Muslim world upon the assumption that it will solve all

its domestic problems along with the problems that affects its relation with the Western world.

Both of these results lead to the importance of invoking religion as an indispensable frame of reference for re-defining key political concepts and theorizing their potential significance for the Muslim world. Further, these two results indicate that in lieu of a mechanism for spreading democracy, resolving the problems spreading democracy may face due to globalization and governing the world democratically, a mechanism for global change is rather needed.

It is noteworthy that leading western academic circles contributed to this endeavor, viz. investigating the way in which Islam (as a way of thinking, a code of conduct and a system of values) may contribute to the political theory domestically and internationally<sup>(82)</sup>.

But how may we secure pluralism within a holistic framework?

We now move forward to the core of this paper:

**Our approach to the issue of global change or reformation from an Islamic perspective for the purpose of achieving human justice.**

Some scholars<sup>(83)</sup> defined global democracy in terms of effecting a global change since global democracy is supposed to encompasses all



regions of the world. In this regard, global democracy involves empowering meta-national institutions to make effective decision on global issues. The members of these institutions, in turn, represent a group of citizens selected through electoral processes. Based on these electoral systems they will be held responsible for their decisions which ought to be made in accordance with agreed upon global standards. In addition no Veto rights will be granted to small minorities. Further, meta-national judicial authorities will be established to resolve conflicts in line with the decisions made even though they may not have license to employ centralized coercive devices.

However, if we consider this definition we will realize that it does not achieve anything beyond a minor change in the procedures, institutions and structures that in turn reflect the traditional western political philosophy and vision. In other words, global democracy in line with this definition, will merely promote a change in the structure of the political order instead of achieving a radical change in the values of the people who are supposedly at the core of this democratization process. Against this background, it is plausible to pose the following questions: is it possible that religion and ethics

in general may contribute to the advancement of the theory of Global Democracy, specifically as far as providing it with an orientation?

However, this question begs another one: Does the literature that currently exists on the necessary conditions of achieving global democracy refer to any specific moral standard? Some of this literature argues that the condition of achieving global democracy is the eradication of global poverty and the establishment of economic justice<sup>(84)</sup>. Others argue that there is no democracy without *δημος* (demos)<sup>(85)</sup>; in other words there is no prospect for defining global democracy unless a clear definition of political groups and people's sovereignty is reached. Thus there are inherent problems in the concept of democracy itself and not that of globalization and the negative effects it has on the exercise of power. This is even further complicated by the fact that globalization has re-defined the concept of a political group beyond the fetters of the limited definition of nation-state.

The liberal, cosmopolitan side puts forward its view of global democracy based on the normative principles that ought to govern it<sup>(86)</sup>. These are three: associated democracy, stake holders' democracy and all-inclusive democracy. All these principles are concretely reflected in

different institutional forms: institutions that have an international dimension (based on international law, trans-governmental administrative networks, parliamentary societies, and international political parties), non-governmental institutions (underground trans-national networks) and integrated institutions (a unified global government or an international federation).

However, all these institutional forms consistently reflect:

- 1- Intergovernmental Multilateralism
- 2- Global Governance
- 3- Global Polity

Finally there is fourth group that maintains that global democracy is possible even though scholars of international relations and comparative political systems have contended that it is impossible to actually establish global democracy<sup>(87)</sup>. Their rationale is that though someone may argue that there are possible means of establishing global democracy despite the fact that its conditions are not fully satisfied, the absence or presence of any of these conditions does not mean that it is actually possible. Further, the same scholars argue that the reality of international relations indicate that the claim that the transformation of anarchy into

polity is possible through the use of violence is inaccurate because this transformation may happen through other non-violent means.

The answer to these questions will show the difference in the philosophies underlying the theories of global democracy and their respective goals.

All these factors made us decisively consider the importance of thinking about a global change and not the mere possibility of establishing global democracy.

The holistic nature of my view is inspired by previous attempts to develop an Islamic *weltanschauung*. These attempts involved sustained efforts exerted in the last decade to Islamize the key concepts of modern social sciences and humanities. Further, there were parallel efforts to advance a robust Islamic critique and alternative to liberal democracy. All these scholarly endeavors were not based on effecting structural or procedural transformation as much as they hinged on developing a modern system of norms inspired by the humanistic vision of Islam.

Among these commendable projects are: the project of Dr. Heba Ra'uf on the critique of capitalistic liberalism, the project of Dr. Mustafa Kamal Bash on the relation between Islam and

democracy, the project of Jonathan Moses on the definition of interest from the respective perspectives of Islam and democracy, the project of Dr. Sulayman on the possible contribution Islamic norms could make to the world, the project of Dr. Isma'il al-Faruqi on the structure of the global order, the project of Dr. Saif Abd al-Fattah on the higher purposes of Islamic law and that of Dr. Suheil 'Inaya on the Islamic projection of future global transformations.

In this context our conception of an Islamic reformation of the world order is an extrapolation of sustained efforts throughout the last two and half decades (from 1986-2009) in project of International Relations of Islam that targeted developing a comprehensive study of the foundations, history and contemporary theory of International relations in the world of Islam, and the study of the world from an Islamic perspective at the same time<sup>(88)</sup>.

**But what are the characterizing features of my view of the Islamic project for global change and reformation? Further how can this ultimately lead to a global democracy based on an Islamic Weltanschauung?**

Responding to this question involves two steps: the first concerns determining and clarifying the methodological constraints for dealing with

proposed the Islamic conception. The second concerns the manifold dimensions of the Islamic perspective on global change and reform.

**Step I: The constraints of defining the concept and its structure.**

Some may think that an Islamic perspective on international relations is merely an idealistic vision. However, the truth is that the Islamic weltanschauung inasmuch as it is realistic, practical and moral delineates the necessary conditions for reform and not only the orientation and telos of such reform on an abstract level.

Thus path towards tackling the issue of global reform and change should take as its point of departure two main challenges: the relation between what is constant and what is variable and the relation between values or norms and reality. These two challenges encompass all the aspects related to the legal and cultural ground of the Islamic perspective on international relations<sup>(89)</sup>.

**1. The relation between the constant and the changing:**

This question refers to the relation between the sources of the Islamic perspective. This relation

in turn refers to the relation between the two constant sources of Islam viz. the Qur'an and the Tradition of the prophet on one hand and the Islamic sciences or the totality of all the attempts of the Muslim scholars to interpret the principles and rulings of the Qur'an and the Tradition of the prophet on the other hand. Here the problematic relation between revelation and reason starts to emerge in connection with all aspects of life and its requirements<sup>(90)</sup>.

Muslims irrespective of the political systems that governs them view themselves as members of the same Muslim nation ('Umma) who are bound—due to the general and specific principles of Islamic law—to communicate with other and transmit to them the fundamentals of their faith. The scope and nature of such communications is delineated in light of the basis of Islamic fundamentals<sup>(91)</sup>.

## **2. The relation between values and reality**

There is not a single internationally recognized definition of values or political norms that may serve as a reference for international relation. The Islamic perspective on international relations demonstrates that a minimal level of agreement on the essence of values and norms is required for managing these relations. These values are defined in the Qur'an and the

Tradition of the prophet. In this vein, ethics in Islam are related to the concept of as-Sunnan (divine/natural laws) and its determination is essentially connected with securing individual and public interests. Scholars interested in the question of values are often concerned about the possible relation between individual and group norms on the international level. Some see that they are analogous and some argue that they are not. However, the question of the possible analogy between individual and group norms is only problematic in Christianity. By contrast, Islam defined each of them separately. Accordingly, studying international relations from the perspective of Islam shows that finding a basis for drawing analogies between the two normative frames of reference and overlapping them is utterly needless; each of them has its separate foundations and can harmoniously coexist with the other<sup>(92)</sup>.

Further the Islamic perspective is considered a midway between moral idealism, that investigates morality from an absolutely idealistic perspective, and historical materialism that is committed to an empirical standpoint and is only concerned with preserving the status quo within a balanced framework<sup>(93)</sup>.



Here the approach of the social theory to international relations may shed light on an important aspect. This view mainly maintained that international politics is a social structure wherein ideologies compete; this view was crystallized after the end of the cold war and is different from materialistic and individualistic standpoints. Further, this view has a lot of implications for studying the international politics which are, in turn, based on four dualities: one of them is that of the ideal versus the material<sup>(94)</sup>.

There is also a trend to review the methodological traditions in view of the problematic relations between the normative and the empirical. The dominance of the empirical approach has subsided based on the impossibility of separating between what is scientifically valid from an empirical standpoint and what is normative<sup>(95)</sup>. However, religion continues to be considered irrelevant to the definition of norms, even among those who call for the importance of the normative dimension to the development of international relations. In addition, the normative realm is often mistakenly confused with that of ethics and morals which are often considered culturally

relative and not frame of reference or binding criterion as is the case with Islamic norms.

Nonetheless, the essence of the western approach to the definition of any concept continues to separate between what is normative and what is material or empirical and between what is partial (individual/societal) and what is holistic (international/global) and between what is domestic and what is international. Further, the western approach focuses on the institutional and operational dimension more than it does on the foundational and historical ones.

By contrast, the legacy of Islamic thought let alone the discourse of the Qur'an explicitly addressed the factors leading to the rise and fall of empires, the factors of reformations and revival among nations let alone laying down the foundations of the relations among nations and peoples in general<sup>(96)</sup>. The Islamic view also did this while taking into consideration all the variables that constitute the essence of human societies. Accordingly, it starts from the level of the individual instead from that of High Politics. For this reason the analysis on the second level presents a system of concepts that Dr. Abu Sulyman called a Qur'an inspired *weltanschauung* that serves as a basis for

reforming the human being first and through this the reformation of the globe<sup>(97)</sup>.

**The second step: delineating the dimensions of the concept of global reform.**

The Islamic perspective on global reform will serve, as we shall now see, our goal of laying down collective foundations for change instead of imposing a unilateral hegemony.

**First: The Islamic motives for reformation and change: the trilogy of preaching, power and jihad.**

The concepts of preaching and jihad are among the fundamental notions of Islam. The specificity and uniqueness of the Islamic perspective on global reform emanate from the relations between these two notions along with their relation with the comparative notion of power.

**a. The basis of international relations from the perspective of the Islamic legal system—according to one of the schools of Islamic law—is preaching.** Further, the basis of the Islamic normative assessment of these relations shows how the notion of preaching Islam and its

principles is central to Islamic view of international relations<sup>(98)</sup>.

Preaching is a continuous process that aims at establishing justice and charity in the world. It is not, as a lot of people tend to mistakenly think, aimed at converting people to Islam. Islam respects other religions and provides a graphic description of the basis of dealing with their followers. From the Islamic perspective, preaching is midway state between war and peace. It does not involve the restlessness and instability of war nor does it involve the inefficacy and the apathy that often accompany long periods of peace. Rather preaching is a state created the Islamic desire for establishing justice and charity in the world while respecting the freedom of others.

**b. the concept of power** whether with regards to its sources, the structures of its distribution or the modes of its interactions is at the core of the all western studies of international relations<sup>(99)</sup>.

The variations in defining the notion of power and the debates surrounding such differences reflects how the constant changes of the global reality adversely affect theoretical consistency. For this reason, Dr. Saif Abd al-Fattah<sup>(100)</sup> made a considerable contribution through his critique

of the main philosophical tendencies of defining power within the western paradigm. These tendencies include giving precedence to material factor in defining power, the Darwinian notion of development based on the principle of 'survival for the fittest'. This led the western paradigm to consider power as an end in itself and so turn into a normative criterion. Further, it made the western paradigm consider power a source of legitimacy; in this vein, it would be illegitimate for a weak power to defy the hegemony of stronger power.

By contrast to these philosophical insights into defining power, the Islamic notion of power is based on the following:

- Power is a tool delegated by God to man, his vicegerent on earth and is intended to fuel the relations among civilizations for the purpose of the construction of the universe. It is not a despotic tool for vanquishing and overpowering others. This does not mean that Islam calls for a submissive or meek attitude. To the contrary, the use of power for its legitimated purposes is an enactment on every Muslim whenever the condition for resorting to power is fulfilled (for

instance, the Palestinian and the Lebanese resistance movements).

- For this reason this conception of power calls for a redefinition of the concept of politics. According to this new conception of politics, only those who are capable of reform are entitled to power. Thus power is tool for the reformation and the construction of the universe, unlike the western paradigm that sees power as a tool for maintaining balance among naturally contending forces in order to maintain the status quo. Hence, the notion of power from the perspective of Islam is qualified by other notions like truth, justice and construction (not interest, conflict, balance of powers, and the balance of interests).
  - Further from the Islamic perspective, power is not merely material power. Despite the importance of material power, there are other moral and intangible forms of power that even gives the material power a push by strengthening the will and determination of the one has it.
- c. The notion of Jihad: It is a fundamental Islamic concept that preoccupied the thought of

Islamic legal scholars and Islamic thinkers. It also attracted the attention of orientalists, whether in a positive or a negative way. But how could it be considered an act of civilization?

First and foremost the two opinions regarding Jihad in the history of Islamic legal thought, whether the one arguing that it is essentially for offense or the one arguing that it is essentially for defense, reflect that the notion of jihad is inextricably related to the relation between the Muslim nation and other nations<sup>(101)</sup>.

Based on the general framework furnished by the notion of preaching and the meaning of power in Islam and contrary to the widespread conception of Jihad, I would like to propose a new way of conceiving Jihad. This new view of Jihad could be summarized as follows<sup>(102)</sup>:

- Jihad is the exertion on part of every Muslim of his utmost power to serve Islam; it can not be considered synonymous with war whether such war is an offensive or a defensive war. It is also wrong equate it with the western conception of holy war.
- Jihad is based on the idea that the relation between the Muslim nation and other nations constantly reflects and by default

reflects a state of preaching not war or peace.

- Jihad as an Islamic principle and value does not rule out the possibility of the eruption of violent conflicts. Further it does not impose Islam as a single alternative solution in all situations.
- For this reason it is important to be aware of the implications of Jihad in all cases. Accordingly, investigation the conditions of resorting to military power verses peaceful mechanisms is a vital component of investigation the notion of jihad. Also in investigation jihad it is important to take into consideration the rules of fighting in Islam and the challenges that engulf Muslims. In other words, jihad can not be defined *in abstracto*; otherwise, this would be a reductive definition.

**Second: the relation between the levels of human gatherings (the levels of analysis, the source of reform and change)**

The relation between the individual, group, nation, state and the globe is a relation of inclusion and not one of excluding a level or sphere at the expense of the other. All of these



levels are indeed overlapping circles. This overlapping relation among these circles reflects the nature of a nation in general and that of the Islamic nation in particular.

While the concept of the nation state has been brought into question recently among Western schools<sup>(103)</sup> the notion of al-'Umma from the Islamic perspective does not preclude the diverse array of organizations that may function within it whether these organizations are individuals, groups or states.

Here, it is important to point to two important issues. One is related to the concept of the state and the other is related to the concept of al-'Umma:

Scholars who investigated the Islamic perspective on international relations compared the Islamic state as an international agent and the nation state<sup>(104)</sup>. The main facets of comparison were: the nature of the evolution of the state, its function, the factors of its rise and those of its fall. In this vein the importance of the normative dimensions for the Islamic state became quite clear. For instance, the Islamic state undertakes a role concerned with the preservation of creed, another concerned with jihad and a third concerned with the construction and the development of the society. This is outright in

contrast with the function of the nation state whose main role consists in defending the national interests of the state, promoting its welfare and securing a proper competitive environment so that the different forces in the society may thrive.

Secondly, the concept of the Islamic 'Umma has a number of epistemological, intellectual and political as well as creed-related dimensions<sup>(105)</sup>. Among the key scholars who pinpointed the centrality of this concept to the Islamic political theory were Dr. Hamid Rabi' and Dr. Muna Abu al-Fadl who also suggested way for developing and re-incorporating it in the corpus of modern political science.

According to Dr. Muna Abu al-Fadl<sup>(106)</sup>, al-'Umma or the Muslim nation is the most important social framework, the Middle East has ever experienced. The true mission of any scholar of Islamic political thought is to turn the concept of al-'Umma into an applicable system and translate its normative dimensions into a well defined administrative system that is capable of establishing and promoting a decent human civilization. Thus according to Dr. Abu al-Fadl the concept of the Muslim 'Umma could be conceived of as mechanism for resolving the problem of identity. It also serves as a key to

investigate issues related to governance, regimes and international relations. Modern political theories have in general all overcome the classical notion of a nation-state. Instead of this rather limited, traditional concept that focuses on nationalism as the key determinant of the function and limits of the state let a lone that overlooks all normative dimensions (whether based on religion or culture) in determining the basis of the relation among states<sup>(107)</sup>. In this vein there were several attempts including of the school of International society, the school of world society, the school of the neo-structuralist school and its focus on the effect of ideas, values and on the formation of the state and international relations in general.

In this vein the concept of the Muslim 'Umma can present the contribution of the Islamic weltanschauung to the growing literature on the theory of state. Such contribution should be welcome in the wake of the revived interest in the role norms and values play in the social theory in general and in the theory of international relations in particular.

Based on a recent contribution by Dr. Amani Salih to the investigation of the concept of the Muslim 'Umma we can summarize the dimensions of this concept as follows<sup>(108)</sup>:

**Al-'Umma as a concept:**

The concept of al-'Umma involves four key dimensions: 1) The totality of the Muslim population is the backbone of the Muslim nation and not the institutions or the state or even the individual; 2) the path (including the creed and code of conduct) is the bond that holds together the different parts of the Muslim nation; 3) the role of the Muslim nation towards its creed includes three levels: achieving integration among all members of the Muslim nation, defending the creed as the exemplar of the best mode of human life and finally positively working for preaching Islam and promoting its principles. 4) The temporal framework of the Muslim nation is not defined in terms of a specific number of years...it is rather determined based on the capacity of each generation of Muslims to accomplish their mission.

Based on these four dimensions we can define an 'Umma as a group of people bound together through bonds of allegiance and loyalty to a way of life that may include a creed and/or a code of conduct. This group in turn seeks to defend its creed and way of life and to promote within a specific period of time.

According to the previous definition the 'Umma refers to a creed and a civilization more than it

refers to social/geographic entity like the nation-state. Accordingly, al-'Umma should be studied epistemologically and not ontologically since the only key variable in defining the specificity of any nation versus the others especially in the field of international relations is creed.

Further, through this definition, nations acquire a historical dimension inasmuch as they evolve through a number of phases. The first phase consists in the formation of its identity and the last is the construction of its political structure. In this vein the state could be seen as the most mature expression of the existence of a certain nation; however, it is not a condition for its persistence. Afterward defense follows...here defense is intended as a state not a stage because it permeates all the phases of the formation of an 'Umma starting from the crystallization of its creed down to the foundation of its institutional structure; in other words it is an integrated dimension of the formation of the body of the 'Umma. Thirdly there is the stage of expansion and hegemony which represents a kind of exercising power with the contending nations.

It follows that by overlooking the concept the 'Umma the science of international relations has so far lacked a powerful analytical tool capable of explaining important dimensions of

international relations and interactions. The concept of al-'Umma also tends to be more comprehensive inasmuch as it does not exclusively focus on one analytical criterion as most theories of international relations tend to reductively do.

**In light of the trilogy of the people-umma-state, the Islamic vision of global reform would involve a number of spheres that simultaneously function:**

1. *Human reformation*: human rights are not merely entitlements; they are necessities. Accordingly, the obverse side of rights is commitments and duties<sup>(109)</sup>. Every human is not only entitled to hold his government accountable for its decision, he also has certain duties towards this 'Umma. In this vein the Islamic notion of 'Umma was ahead of its western counterparts in introducing and implementing a system similar to the modern programs of civil, democratic and pluralism education<sup>(110)</sup>. Man according to the Islamic weltanschauung is innocent and does not bear responsibility for anyone else's errors even if the latter is his brother. Not only this, every member of the society is required to work for the reformation of what others have corrupted. Further, man

according to the Islamic worldview is in harmony not in conflict with nature.

This weltanschauung is not restricted to man in his individual life, it extends to man's social relations and role in the family, state and 'Umma. This harmonizes man's versatile roles as God's vicegerent on earth whose main quest is to make the best use of the bounties God bestowed upon him to establish a just and fair society.

Accordingly, political democracy from the perspective of the Islamic weltanschauung is only acceptable as long as it does not contradict with the normative constraints that define humanity and secure the soundness of human societies.

2. *Social reformation*: According to the Islamic world view, the causes of the weakness of nations and groups are mainly related to deficiency in observing norms and values. Therefore, reform considers the realm of values and norms its key point of departure and gate to the reformation of others aspects of social and political order of any nation. In this vein it is not worthy that the Islamic approach is quite holistic in its nature. This means that the reformation of the cultural, spiritual, and intellectual orientation of the nation is a must for securing the reformation of every member of it. Accordingly,

the difference between the wider and more comprehensive definition of the 'Umma or nation vis-à-vis and that of the state is reflected in the concept of reformation and its structure. Nonmaterial factors were considered part of the Islamic approach to history and historiography was an important component of the Islamic approach to the rise and fall of civilizations and the history of international systems<sup>(111)</sup>.

### **Thirdly: the system of the reformation values and norms**

Through its conceptions of divinity and prophecy let alone its intellectual feats, the Islamic civilization presented a number of important concepts that constitute a unique weltanschauung. These concepts could be summarized as follows<sup>(112)</sup>:

### **Cultural pluralism and multiplicity**

Pluralism from the Islamic perspective is based on uniqueness and specificity of various paradigms and cultures. However, this should not imply dissociation, fragmentation and conflict. Indeed, from a purely philosophical basis, differentiation and specificity can not be conceived except against the background of the



concept of a whole—Hegel and Fichte explained this point quite explicitly. This original whole, from the Islamic perspective, is represented by and defined in terms of the system of norms and values upon which Islam bases its concept of human nature and man in general.

The Islamic worldview restricts oneness to God and views pluralism and multiplicity as the key onto-epistemological determination of all creatures and beings. In other words, pluralism is part and parcel of metaphysical constitution of the cosmos and all beings in it including man. Thus, the Islamic perspective does not only see pluralism as requirement for political growth; rather, it views it as a constitutive fundamental of human nature and the structure of human gatherings. In this vein, the Islamic civilization throughout its history gave unique examples of preserving and protecting multiculturalism, promoting it, and safeguarding against the dominion of one culture over the other.

### **Cultural exchange**

Islam explicitly acknowledges the multiplicity and diversity of cultures. It also asserts that this must not be a ground for conflict; to the contrary, Islam sees multiculturalism as basis for

exchange, mutual benefit and enhancement of knowledge and civilization.

According to the Islamic worldview this exchange ought to be based on a system of norms to achieve the best and most exalted level of communication on the cultural, political and economic levels. In and of itself, this reflects the Islamic ethics and weight it assigns to moral commitment toward others. Further, this is in line with the basis of Islamic preaching and its humanitarian orientation as explained above.

This principle of cultural exchange shows the falsity of the conviction that Islam is a self-enclosed culture that opposes exchange and dialogue with others cultures and civilization and dismisses them as erroneous and infidel.

### **A dialogue rather than a conflict between civilizations**

While Islam invites all mankind to believe in God, it did not expect or assume that all people will convert to Islam. Accordingly, dialogue and mutual relations played emerge as important components of the relation between the Muslim nation and other nations. Further, Islam fosters the competition between civilizations through intellectual debates that should all take place

within the boundaries set by the humanitarian norms defined by Islam. The ultimate aim of such dialogue and competition is to arrive at a mutual agreement/compromise that brings all cultures and civilizations into intimacy.

However, it is important to bear in mind that this is form of cultural dialogue is different than the widespread notion of the dialogue among religions. The cultural dialogue and the exchange between civilizations that Islam promotes is a more comprehensive form of exchange of values and norms based on a common humanistic ground. It is thus not limited to mutual agreements or compromises between religious dogmas.

In this vein and inspired by the discourse of the Qur'an and the prophet, the Islamic civilization worked on opening channels for communication with other cultures and civilizations. Also Islam assigns minor importance to the historical perspectives that may kindle rather than resolve conflicts between civilizations. Instead, Islam stresses the commitment to goals that bolster human values and norms as commonplace among all civilizations and cultures.

### **Cultural competition**

The basis of what we labeled cultural competition in Islam is the Islamic determination to resolve conflicts that may arise due to cultural diversity and multiplicity and to foster the development and growth of the quality of human life. In this vein, Islam rejects the idea of negating the other or superseding him; Islam does not want to contain the other. Instead Islam sees the acceptance of the other culturally and intellectually as an essential goal that it strives to accomplish and a value that it endeavors to disseminate to others cultures. Not only this, Islam considers tolerance and the acceptance of the other as a sine-qua-non to its own enhancement.

### **Cultural Cycles and Circulations**

Human history proved an important idea that is at the heart of the Islamic weltanschauung, viz. that human civilizations have ages and go through phases of development and mutations. Accordingly, Islam accepts the idea that each historical period should be led by a specific nation and that not all nations can continue to take the lead of the world. It is thus the role of the non-leading nations to inform and discipline the leadership of the leading nation in each and every historical phase.

**Fourthly: The purpose of the Islamic reform (unification, purification and construction)**

Through out the paper, we have discussed a lot of Islamic notions including justice, the burden of being God's vicegerent on earth, the commitment to the construction of the world, the respect for others humanity. The purpose of all these principles is the establishment of a global order based on the trilogy of unification, purification and construction.

- This view was summarized by Khurshid Ahmad as follows<sup>(113)</sup>:

"The real strength of Muslim civilization had always been in the simultaneous pursuit of moral excellence and material strength, prosperity and security. All the phases of the rise and expansion of Muslim civilization were characterized by the dynamic operation of this èlan: whenever this balance was disturbed, the forces of decline and disintegration weakened the fabric of Muslim society and led to its downfall Throughout its historic march, spread over fourteen centuries, Muslim history has witnessed

many periods of strength and weakness, of rise and fall, as also of ebb and flow and rout and rally. Yet what has been unique throughout is the inner resilience of the Islamic èlan and its articulation in different space and time situations. After every decline, there has been a fresh wave of revival characterised by efforts of renovation and regeneration that responded creatively to the challenges of the time.

A careful reading of the history of the last fourteen centuries reveals this dynamic nature of the Muslim ethos which has expressed itself in different space/time scenarios."

- Here the **concept of humanity** is quite salient and plays a rather conspicuous role. Humanity and not the Muslim nation is the aim of global reform and change. Accordingly, cultural exchange and the competition among civilizations let alone the values of tolerance and the acceptance of the others are all tailored to serve a higher purpose,

namely, the well being of mankind and not the limited scope of interest of a particular nation or state. This humanitarian orientation of the Islamic worldview and its reformative project is in line with emerging trends in western thought that call for the humanization of globalization and of world politics and seek to establish human security<sup>(114)</sup>. Theoretically, this human orientation of Islamic thought as the subject matter of a number of intellectual endeavors including the prominent works of the late Dr. Abd al-Wahhab al-Messiri<sup>(115)</sup>.

Further Islam promotes the notion of human security based on a comprehensive civilizational approach<sup>(116)</sup> and asserts that it should be maintained through rational and wise order, the respect for the common use of resources and combating corruption. This notion of security is essentially humanitarian. It aims at promoting and serving the purposes of the betterment of human life and enhancing man's harmony with nature. What further enhances this notion humanitarian concept of security and gives it

uniqueness is the view that man is God's vicegerent on earth and that all the resources available on earth are the common property of all mankind to which every human being is by nature entitled. Thus the role of the Muslim nation is not to pursue and secure its individual interests in a selfish and rather Darwinian manner. Rather the role of the Muslim nation is to secure the just and fair distribution of wealth and maintaining the security of every member of the human society. In this vein al-Kawakbi argues that Islamic politics consists in the just administration of the common interests of the member of the society.

**In summary, the Islamic reformative view is based on two main principles:**

1. First it deals with humanity or mankind as a whole.
2. Its main aim is not to convert the whole world to Muslims; rather its aim is to establish justice and charity. In this vein the challenge that confronts every Muslim is to devise venues whereby he can coexist with other civilizations and transmit his humanitarian perspective to them through debate.

It attempts to avoid the binary approach we find in discourses of global democracy, and without



minimizing the horizons of it to mean only the prevention of war or global governance that serves Western interests. Reforming the world order is conditioned in the Islamic perspective by genuine participation of all nations in setting the goals of that order in a cooperative and peaceful manner.

Among the key western thinkers who noticed this unique character of the Islamic civilization was Armando Salvatore who indicates in his book *The Public Sphere*<sup>(117)</sup> that the Islamic civilization in distinction from the Christian and Jewish religious dogmas presents a concrete application of a humanistic framework for global reform based on the respect of higher and shared interest of humanity as a whole<sup>(118)</sup>.

Whether or not this humanitarian perspective on global reform will be considered vis-à-vis that of global democracy is a question that requires considerable pondering especially that the latter is being promoted by the main hegemonic democracies in the world.

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الأبعاد المادية وغير المادية، وحول أبعاد المقارنة بين منظور إسلامي والمنظورات الأخرى التي وظفت التاريخ في دراسة "التغير الدولي" انظر:

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(117) Armando Salvatore: op. cit, pp. 9-12.

(118) Ibid: Cha. 4.